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Impact of the implementation of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio in banks’ lending 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the causal relationship between the Liquidity Coverage Ratio regulation 
and banks´ lending activity in Europe. Using a fixed-effects panel data estimation, we found 
evidence that the LCR does not restricts banks’ lending activity to households, non-financial 
corporations, and from an aggregate perspective. This result supports the use of the LCR as a 
minimum regulatory requirement. However, when looking into details of the LCR, the impact 
of the High-Quality Liquid Assets held by a bank is significant on their loans provided. In 
particular, the credit is reduced by 0.305% on average when the HQLAs increase by 1%.  
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Introduction 
One of the main purposes of banks is their position in the economies as financial 
intermediaries, as they provide for maturity and liquidity transformation services. In other 
words, banks have the ability to transform short-term deposits into long-term loans which can 
be used to produce long-term investments, and consequently foster economic growth. From a 
broad perspective, banks are able to produce a profit by charging a higher interest rate on the 
credit they give, then on the money they borrow. Therefore, it is of the interest of the field of 
Economics to understand how banks’ credit supply may be affected by banking regulation.   
The 2008 financial crisis has proven that there was weak regulation put into place for 
banks to face unexpected losses. Not only from an own funds perspective, but also, among 
others, from a liquidity and accounting1 perspective, European banks were not ready to 
withstand the financial crisis, in which Central banks2 and governments had to intervene in 
order to prevent the collapse of the international financial system. Moreover, one of the most 
important lessons taken from the 2008 financial crisis was that there was a problem of moral 
hazard installed in the world economy. It became clear that banks and other systemically 
important institutions (G-SIIs) could expect to be bailed-out, since their failure could cause 
severe problems to the international financial system. Therefore, Governments and Central 
Banks had to step in and help commercial banks to face their capital and liquidity needs. 
Central banks had to become lenders of first resort, and not lenders of last resort in order to 
re-finance banks (BIS, 2016). The moral hazard problem was clear from several perspectives, 
and more regulation by standard setters was needed. 
                                                          
1 The IASB developed the IFRS 9, an accounting standard which is based in an expected credit loss framework, 
which can be considered more prudent, as the accounting measures is the basis for prudential capital 
calculations. 
2In Europe, the European Central Bank (hereinafter ECB) had to provide liquidity to the economy by lowering 
their key interest rate by 325 points and by providing for non-standard measures related to liquidity 
management in order to deal with this fragilities at the time of the crisis (Trichet, 2009). 
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Before the financial crisis took place in Europe, the Basel Committee3 had already 
introduced the first and second Basel accords in 1988 and 2006 respectively. While Basel I 
had introduced a minimum capital requirement of 8% based on the risk weighted assets held 
by banks, the Basel II framework (also called the Revised Capital Framework) introduced the 
three pillars of banking supervision. In fact, the Basel II framework enhanced the minimum 
capital requirements that banks had to held, set supervisory practices on the capital held by 
banks, and focused on the disclosures which banks had to engage in order to promote market 
discipline . However, the Basel II risk-weight framework proved to have some shortcomings 
since it did not have in place sufficient capital requirements that would ensure that banks 
could withstand losses in times of stress, as well as not taking into account other types of 
risks4, such as liquidity risk. As an answer to the financial crisis and to the shortcomings of 
the Basel II framework, the Basel III framework was introduced in 2010 setting new 
regulatory requirements. In fact, the reforms introduced by the Basel III framework were put 
into place in order to renovate the regulation applicable to banks by taking into account new 
and emerging risks, including liquidity risk. Although these regulations have the purpose to 
diminish the likelihood and impact of bank failures, it is important to highlight that the 
regulations entail restrictions on banks’ activities as financial intermediaries in the economies, 
as banks may be restrained from using short-term deposits to provide long term loans which 
can promote economic growth.  
  Although the own funds regulations on Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital represent some of the most important ratios that banks have to comply with, the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (hereinafter LCR) is also a binding ratio for banks which was 
introduced under the Basel III framework in order to introduce a measure for liquidity risk. 
                                                          
3 The Basel Committee is the primary international global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks 
4 For more information on regulations to deal with other types of risks that the Basel III framework 
implemented and how it was introduced in the European Union, please see Annex 2 
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Contrary to regulations related to own funds, relatively few papers have studied the possible 
negative impacts of liquidity regulation on banks. Regulations dealing with liquidity risk only 
started to be implemented at an international level with the Basel III framework and became 
binding only on 2015, while the minimum regulatory own funds exist since 1988 under Pillar 
1 of banking regulation. A consensus has not been reached on the liquidity regulation’s 
impact on banks’ loans. Although empirical studies conclude that there is no impact on banks’ 
credit supply, simulation analysis conclude the opposite. It should also be referred that even 
after the Basel III framework was implemented, some banks faced liquidity problems5.  
  In this paper, I study the impact of the implementation of the LCR in banks’ loans 
provided from European banks, with separated distinctions from loans provided to households 
and non-financial corporations. Contrary to previous studies and after the implementation of 
the liquidity regulation in 2015, this analysis is based on data of what can be considered a 
non-stress period (from 2016 to 2018). In this period, although the regulation may diminish 
the likelihood and the impact of a liquidity crisis, this positive impact can be considered 
smaller compared to the costs associated with the lending restrictions imposed by the LCR.  
 
The liquidity role in the financial crisis and how the LCR was introduced in Europe 
The 2008 financial crisis proved that there was not sufficient liquidity regulation put into 
place in order to meet the liquidity needs that banks may face during a stress period. Since 
banks lend more money or give more credit than what they have available, they may not be 
able to meet a high short-term demand on their deposits. This is the main concept involving 
                                                          
5 Two important European banks were declared to be failing or likely to fail by the ECB in 2017. In the case of 
the Spanish bank, Banco Popular Espanõl S.A., the ECB stated that the decision followed after a significant 
deterioration of the liquidity situation of the bank (ECB, 2017). On the other hand, in the case of the Italian 
bank Veneto Banca Società per Azioni, the ECB assessed that a number of key indicators of the institution 
showed a very weak liquidity situation of the institution (ECB,2017).   
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liquidity risk. In the traditional framework, liquidity risk was perceived to exist in the format 
of bank runs (Bonfim and Kim, 2013). This means that banks would not be able to fulfill their 
short-term obligations because the depositors, when losing confidence on the bank, would 
withdraw their money from the bank, aggravating the problem. This could force the credit 
institution to engage into fire-sales6 on illiquid assets in order to meet short-term demands, 
which could lead the bank to an insolvency situation (Strahan, 2012). 
While the case of Northern Rock in the UK can be a good example of the traditional 
framework for a liquidity crisis, as a bank-run by depositors took place during the financial 
crisis (Banerjee and Mio, 2015), there was lack of perception that liquidity risk could exist 
through other types of channels other than depositors. In fact, the liquidity crisis was mainly 
caused by lending and inter-banking financial arrangements. This may include “undrawn loan 
commitments, obligations to repurchase securitized assets, margin calls in the derivatives 
markets, and withdrawal of funds from wholesale short-term financing arrangements7” 
(Strahan, 2012)8. The arrangements described by Strahan (2012) are not connected with 
depositors, but instead to other financial institutions. In a systemic liquidity crisis, other 
financial institutions also need short-term funding, and would, for example, make use of the 
agreed revolving credit facilities, or stop providing short-term deposits for other financial 
institutions. In fact, the great dependence that some credit institutions had on wholesale 
funding were one of the major problems in the liquidity crisis (Huang and Ratnovski, 2011).  
                                                          
6 This expression can be used to describe the act of selling an asset below its market value due to an immediate 
need of credit 
7 These terms are associated with liquidity risks as a party may not have control over the valuation of the assets 
or the actions that third parties perform. For more detail, please see Strahan (2012) 
8 Authors such as Huang and Ratnovski (2011) and Borio (2010) also pointed out to this new perception of 
liquidity risks 
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In the Basel III implementation, the LCR and the Net Stable Funding Ratio9 (NSFR) 
were created by the Basel committee in order to deal with liquidity risk. The LCR was created 
in order to “promote the short-term resilience of a bank’s liquidity risk profile by ensuring 
that it has sufficient high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to survive a significant stress scenario 
lasting for 30 days” (BIS 2013). This were the main global liquidity regulations which were 
implemented, but this paper focus solely on the LCR10.  
  The LCR11 forces credit institution to hold a sufficient amount of High-Quality Liquid 
Assets12 (hereinafter HQLA), such as cash, central bank reserves, or marketable securities 
representing claims or secured by certain institutions (such as central banks), compared to the 
net liquidity outflows over a 30-calendar day stress period.  This means that, for example, if 
banks would provide too many loans, then they would not have as much cash to contribute to 
their HQLA, and if banks do not secure their deposits, then they would have a higher run-off 
rate on a stress scenario lowering the LCR13. The minimum requirements of this ratio for 
credit institutions has not been fixed over the years, as the Basel Committee has provided for 
transitional arrangements for it to be gradually implented and for credit institutions to have 
time to adjust to the new requirements (BIS, 2013). The LCR has been implemented from 
2015 with specific phased-in percentages14 that the bank must comply with over the years.  
                                                          
9 The NSFR was created in order to “promote resilience over a longer time horizon by creating additional 
incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis by forcing 
banks to hold a sufficient amount of highly liquid assets.” (BIS 2010). 
10 It should be also noted that the Basel Committee did created additional liquidity regulations other than the 
NSFR and the LCR. “In addition to the LCR and NSFR standards, the minimum quantitative standards that banks 
must comply with, the Committee has developed a set of liquidity risk monitoring tools to measure other 
dimensions of a bank’s liquidity and funding risk profile.” (BIS, 2013). 
11 Please see equation 1 for reference on how the LCR is calculated 
12 High-Quality Liquid Assets are assets which can be easily and quickly converted into cash which a bank may 
use in order to face immediate liquidity needs. The assets in the LCR calculation are divided between level 1, 
level 2A and level 2B assets with decreasing levels of liquidity. The assets may range from cash, to marketable 
securities, to residential mortgage backed securities. 
13 For more detail on how the LCR is calculated and the items it includes please see: 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf 
14 For more detail on the phased in percentages of the LCR, please see table 1 
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Literature  
While there are a lot of benefits15 connected with liquidity regulation, the mains cost of 
liquidity regulation is its possible negative effect on maturity and liquidity transformation. 
The LCR does not permit banks to give more credit to the economy from one point onwards, 
since this could make the bank not compliant with the ratio16. The costs of liquidity regulation 
may include, among others, a reduction of credit supply and consequently in aggregate output, 
an increase of the proportion of government bonds to private bonds held by banks (which may 
cause an undesirable dependence on government debt), and a decrease in net interest income 
(NII) of the banks which affects their profitability (BIS, 2016).  
  Before the LCR was implemented by the Basel Committee, there were already similar 
liquidity regulations implemented in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom in which 
some researches were conducted to measure the costs of liquidity regulation. Banerjee and 
Mio (2015) studied the impact of a liquidity regulation implemented in the UK in the balance 
sheets of UK credit institutions. In 2010, the Financial Service Authority (FSA) created the 
Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG) applied individually to each bank in order to tackle 
liquidity concerns. In fact, the ILG required banks to hold a sufficient amount of  HQLAs 
compared to bank-specific liquidity shocks. This regulation was later replaced by the LCR in 
2015. The similarities between ILG and LCR were in fact strong17. The percentage applicable 
to each bank was set by the FSA, providing for a heterogeneous implementation of the 
regulation. Furthermore, the authors calculated the average treatment effect of the regulation 
in a number of dimensions, and they concluded that there was “no evidence that the 
introduction of the ILG had a negative impact on bank lending to the non-financial sector, 
                                                          
15 For more detail on the benefits of liquidity regulation and on the associated studies, please see Annex 3 
16It is important to notice that it should not be expected that liquidity regulations provide a total coverage over 
the credit that banks give to the economy, but instead to a reasonable amount which could absorb some 
expected and non-expected liquidity shocks that the bank could face (BIS, 2016). 
17 Please see equation 2 for reference 
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either in terms of the quantity or price of lending.” (Banerjee and Mio, 2015). On the other 
hand, Bonner and Eijffinger (2012) studied the effects of a binding regulatory liquidity 
requirement on the behavior of banks in the unsecure interbank market in the Netherlands 
(Bonner and Eijffinger, 2012). The authors took advantage of the implementation in 2003 by 
the Dutch National Bank of a liquidity regulation which forced banks’ liquidity to exceed 
specific minimum requirements of one week and one month. The authors used bank-specific 
monthly data of the Dutch Liquidity Coverage Ratio (DLCR), which treated interbank loans 
under the same manner as the LCR does (Bonner and Eijffinger, 2012). The authors 
concluded that “for lending volumes, the main effect of the quantitative liquidity rule is 
exerted during stress, given that banks for which the rule is binding cut lending more 
drastically than their peers” (Bonner and Eijffinger, 2012). Furthermore, I will briefly 
mention an empirical analysis provided by DeYoung and Jang (2016) who tested how 
commercial banks in the U.S. managed their liquidity positions between 1992 and 2012. The 
authors used the loan-to-deposit ratio as a proxy for the NSFR and concluded that banks 
“manage their core deposits balances … more actively than they manage their loan 
balances…” (DeYoung and Jang, 2016) 
Contrary to the empirical analysis which have concluded that liquidity regulation does 
not have a significant impact on credit and on output (BIS, 2016), there were simulations 
computed regarding the impact of liquidity regulation on banks which concluded otherwise. 
Nicolò et al (2014), Covas and Driscol (2014) and De Bandt and Chahad (2015) computed 
simulations of data and concluded that in fact the loan variation caused by the implementation 
of liquidity regulations is negative. Using a dynamic partial equilibrium model, Nicolò et al 
(2014) concluded that liquidity requirements led to an increase in capital ratios by a not 
efficient increase in bond holdings (Nicolò et al, 2014). The consequence was a significant 
decrease in loans by 26% (assuming a leverage ratio of 4% and LCR of 50%). On the other 
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hand, Covas and Driscol (2014) tested the “macroeconomic impact of introducing a minimum 
liquidity standard for banks on top of existing capital adequacy requirements” (Covas and 
Driscol ,2014). In their paper, the authors used a nonlinear dynamic general equilibrium 
model18 as they argue that “effects on lending and other banking variables are substantially 
larger in partial equilibrium analysis which takes prices as given. This result suggests that 
attempting to apply partial equilibrium results … are likely to be misleading” (Covas and 
Driscol ,2014). Although the impact is reduced when taking into the dynamics between loan 
prices and loan quantities, the authors still found that a negative 3.1% impact on loans 
provided takes place when capital requirements are set at 6%. Moreover, De Bandt and 
Chahad (2015) computed a “large scale DSGE model with a real and a financial sector, as 
well as a distinction between retail and wholesale banking”(De Bandt and Chahad, 2015). 
They assumed an increase of liquidity regulation from 60% to 85% in a period of 4 years. The 
authors have found that the sum of shocks computed between capital and liquidity regulations 
is close to the global impact of both shocks, which may indicate that liquidity and capital 
regulation may be complementary (De Bandt and Chahad, 2015).  In their base scenario, the 
authors have found that the loans made to Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is 
reduced by 3%, while corporate loans are reduced by 2%. 
 
Data and methodology 
In order to measure the impact of the implementation of the LCR in the credit supply 
provided to the European economies, I used a quarterly panel dataset comprising Banks’ 
                                                          
18 The nonlinear dynamic general equilibrium model that the authors computed allow them to take into 
account that prices are not exogenous, and instead the general equilibrium prices adjust to clear the loan, 
securities, assets and labor markets. Moreover, this model attenuates the negative impact of liquidity 
regulation, as the loan supply is reduced, and consequently the equilibrium loan rate increases by 11 basis 
points, which in turns make loans more attractive (Covas and Driscol ,2014) 
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specific financial statements from the second quarter of 2016 until de third quarter of 201819. 
The longitudinal20 dataset includes 147 European banks which were chosen randomly but to 
which the liquidity coverage ratio applies based on the European Union rules and National 
discretions of the relevant competent authorities. Besides the banks’ specific data, I also used 
Macroeconomic data provided by various sources, such as the Eurostat. I have computed 
three basic regressions using the xtreg21 command in Stata, which measures the impact of 
LCR on either total loans, loans made to households, and loans made to non-financial 
corporations, all of them being weighed against banks’ total assets. I used common variables 
to all of these regressions, which in their essence are regulatory variables (LCR or HQLAs 
ratio to total assets, CET1 ratio and LCR shortfall), banks’ dimension variables (the logarithm 
of banks’ total assets), deposits indicators (total deposits, ratio of overnight deposits over total 
deposits, percentage of households deposits to total deposits, and percentage of non-financial 
corporations deposits to total deposits), interest rates variables (EOINA rate), loans’ 
profitability indicators (banks’ lending margin per country on the difference between loans to 
households, and to non-financial corporations) and macroeconomic variables (GDP growth 
rate, unemployment rate and house prices growth rate per country). In table 2 you are able to 
find more detail on the variables used on the regressions. 
I used a basic linear unobserved effects panel data model. These models allow for the 
existence of omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2001).  In fact, a time constant unobserved 
effect or, in other words, an individual-bank specific effect is assumed to exist. This is a 
reasonable assumption since the banking industry contains great levels of complexity with, 
                                                          
19 The dataset is not completely balanced as there were some variables which were only available until the end 
of 2017 
20 Meaning that the individuals followed over time did no change 
21 The xtreg command is used to fit regression models to panel data. Robust standards errors were used in 
order to correct problems of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. For more detail, please see Wooldridge 
(2013) 
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for example, different business models used by different sized banks, and this individual 
specific effects can be expected to affect our dependent variable, the ratio of loans to total 
assets made by the banks. In terms of modeling, I used the following equation to estimate the 
coefficients on the impact on total loans, on loans to households, and on loans to non-
financial corporations:  
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 𝛼1 + 𝑀𝑗𝑡
𝑞 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝑖 + ũ𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
𝑖 = 1, … ,147; 𝑡 = 1, … ,10; 𝑗 = 1, … ,2922; 𝑘 = 1, … ,7;  𝑞 = 1, … ,5. 
  The dependent variables (𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) can be either the total loans provided, the total loans 
provided only to households, or the total loans provided only to non-financial corporations by 
a specific bank (therefore computing three separated regressions), all weighted against banks’ 
total assets. The equation can be read as the following: The loans to total assets ratio provided 
by a specific institution (i), headquartered at a certain country (j), at a certain quarter (t) are 
dependent on the intercept (𝛼0), on banks’ specific level data, (𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 ) (in which “k” is the 
number of regressors), on the macroeconomic indicators (𝑀𝑗𝑡
𝑞
) (in which “q” is the number of 
macroeconomic regressors), on the time constant unobserved individual effects (𝑐𝑖) and on the 
idiosyncratic error (ũ𝑖𝑗𝑡). The regression was computed with robust standard errors in order to 
avoid heteroskedasticity and especially serial correlational concerns (Wooldridge, 2013).  
  
Fixed effects and random effects models: the reason why I have chosen Fixed effects 
The basic unobserved effects model can be written the following way: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡β + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector that contains observable variables, 𝑐𝑖 is the individual unobservable 
                                                          
22 Norway is included as the only country which is not part of the European Union 
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specific effect and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error (Wooldridge, 2001). In order to choose the 
model to be estimated we need to assess whether the individual effect 𝑐𝑖 can be considered as 
random, or as a parameter to be estimated (Wooldridge, 2001). The following two conditions 
are used to assess the consistency of a fixed and random effects models 
1 − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖, 𝑐𝑖) = 0, t = 1, … , T 
2 − 𝐸(𝑐𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) = 𝐸(𝑐𝑖) = 0 
The first condition is the strict exogeneity assumption conditional on the individual specific 
effect, while the second one is the orthogonality condition.  On one hand, both the random 
effects and fixed effects estimation models need the strict exogeneity condition to hold in 
order for the estimation under feasible generalized least squares to be consistent. On the other 
hand, while the random effects estimation needs the second assumption, the fixed effects 
estimation does not. In fact, the fixed effects estimation allows for the unobservable 
individual specific effect to be any function of the independent variables. The second 
assumption is in fact very strong since it assumes that the correlation between the observed 
explanatory variables and the unobserved effect is zero (Wooldridge, 2001).  
In my case the orthogonality assumption is a very strong assumption, as it can be expected 
that for example, a bank’s specific risk appetite which defines their constant-over-time risk 
management strategies (𝑐𝑖) (and may determine the lending activity of an institution) can be 
correlated with other variables that I used, such as a banks´ specific CET1 ratio. In fact, 
Bonner and Eijffinger (2012) also applied a panel regression estimation with fixed effects in 
their paper on the impact of LCR on the Interbank money-market. One of their main 
justifications was exactly that individual specific effects may represent omitted variable bias 
and that this effects were likely to be correlated with the regressors, creating a problem of 
endogeneity, as they included different sized banks (just as in the case of this paper). The 
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authors explain that this implies that individual specific effects are not random (Bonner and 
Eijffinger, 2012). It should also be taken into account that one of the limitations of the fixed 
effects estimation is the fact that it cannot include time-invariant variables, and that this ends 
up not representing a significant constraint. This is because the interest of my analysis is on 
time-varying variables (the lending behavior of the banks depending on the LCR). This 
argument was also used by Bonner and Eijffinger (2012) when justifying the use of a fixed 
effects estimation.  
  Moreover, I computed the xtoverid23 test which is a test of overidentifying restrictions. 
I concluded that a fixed effects model would be more appropriate, since the orthogonality 
conditions hold for the fixed effects estimation, as the chi-square found is 145.774 which in 
turn implies that the P-value is very close to zero. I also computed the Hausman test24  and I 
concluded that the coefficients estimated under a Fixed-effects estimation and a Random-
effects estimation are different, which indicates that differences between banks are not 
random, as the Chi-square distribution for this values was 123.04, indicating that the P-value 
is very close to zero25. Furthermore, it is safer to trade the efficiency that could be given by 
random effects estimation, by the consistency that fixed effects assures, as the consistency of 
the model will make statistical inference on the coefficients possible.  
 
Main findings 
A preliminary analysis of the relationship between the LCR and the ratio of total loans to total 
assets held by each bank shows when the data is aggregated by country (figure 3), it does 
                                                          
23 Please see figure 1 for reference  
24 Please see figure 2 for reference. I have rescaled the variables by multiplying or dividing the coefficient for 
the test to work properly 
25 A P-value close to zero means that the null hypothesis which favors the use of the random effects estimation 
is rejected, and therefore the result favors the use of a Fixed-effects model. The tests were performed with the 
full list of independent variables used in the total loans estimated regression 
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seem that LCR affects negatively the loans provided by banks, despite the high variance of 
the results. However, when the data is aggregated at bank level (figure 4), it seems that the 
correlation between the LCR and the ratio of total loans to total assets held is positive, 
showing a different relationship compared to when the data is aggregated at the country level. 
This can be explained by the fact that the correlation does not control for other variables. 
When looking at figure 5, it is possible to visualize that the loans of the banks weighted on 
their total assets has a great level of  variance. The average is around 50%, which clearly 
indicates the importance of the loans provided by banks in their activity. On the other hand, in 
figure 6 it is possible to conclude that there is also a significant variance of the LCR among 
the sample chosen. While most of banks comply with an LCR of 100%, the average in the 
sample is very close to 200%, which proves that most of the banks set their LCR significantly 
higher than the minimum requirement. Furthermore, in figure 7, it is possible to visualize a 
slightly positive relationship between the regulatory requirements of the CET1 ratio and LCR. 
 
Regressions computed and conclusions 
In the first place, it was studied the impact of the LCR on banks’ lending26. We found 
evidence that the LCR does not have any impact on the loans provided by banks, either at an 
aggregated level, or separately to either households or non-financial corporations. This 
conclusion was taken when looking at the P-value for the specific regressions presented in 
tables 3 4 and 5, which are 0.945, 0.231 and 0.629 respectively.  This can be explained by the 
fact that a higher LCR ratio will also mean that the banks may be viewed as more financial 
stable, and this can enable the bank to provide for a higher amount of loans (BIS, 2016) 
                                                          
26 Please see tables 3,4 and 5 for reference 
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  Secondly, we have performed a more detailed analysis on the LCR ratio by using the 
ratio of high-quality liquid assets to total assets. That is, taking into account only a part of the 
LCR (the numerator, excluding therefore the net stressed outflows which are based on 
additional assumptions27 in order to be computed, which may distort the analysis).  
Under my estimation in tables 6 and 7, I found that the lowest BIC criterion28 for the impact 
of the HQLAs on total loans and on loans to non-financial corporations respectively was 
found for the third column29. On the other hand, the lowest BIC criterion for the impact of the 
HQLAs on loans to households was found for the second column30 in table 8. These 
regressions included the following regressors: HQLA, CET1 ratio, the shortfall to an LCR of 
100%, the share of deposits on total assets, the overnight deposits weight on total deposits, the 
share of household’s deposits or non-financial corporation deposits to total deposits, and the 
logarithm of banks’ total assets.  
 The HQLAs ratio to total assets, the share of deposits on total assets, and the logarithm of 
total assets were significant mostly at the 1% P-value level. The coefficient on the HQLA 
ratio to total assets is significant and negative for all of the 3 regressions previously pointed 
out in tables 6,7 and 8, columns 3, 3 and 2 respectively. The coefficients on the HQLAs are -
0.305,  -0.127 and -0.173 for the regressions on which the dependent variable is total loans, 
loans to households, and loans to non-financial corporations respectively, which are divided 
                                                          
27 The net stressed outflows depend on cash outflows and cash inflows. The cash outflows depend on, for 
example, retail deposits or secured funding,  while cash inflows depend on, for example, secured lending. The 
cash outflows and inflows are subjected to calibrated run-off rates based on information from the financial 
crisis, internal stress scenarios of banks, and existing regulatory and supervisory standards. For more detail, 
please see: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1212g.pdf  
28 The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) can be used as a criterion to compare different models. The criterion 
is based on the likelihood function as well as the number of regressors to be estimated. In order to better fit a 
specific model, we may add regressors as it may increase the likelihood by adding parameters. However, this 
may also cause a problem of overfitting in which the model can include variables of no interest which may 
deteriorate the model’s explanatory power. The BIC criterion takes this into account since it has a penalty term 
for the number of parameters which are included into the model.  
29 The lowest BIC criterion in table 6 and 7 is  -3961.828 and -4615.051 respectively, in the third column 
30 The lowest BIC criterion in table 8 was -4450.203 in the second column 
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by banks’ total assets. This means that on average, if the ratio of HQLAs to total assets 
increases by 1%, the ratio of total loans to total assets provided by a specific bank is expected 
to decrease by 0.305% (0.173% in case of loans provided only to households, and 0.127% in 
case of loans provided only to non-financial corporations) in that period.  
  However, the CET1 ratio and the shortfall to a 100% LCR ratio was rarely significant 
for all of the regressions computed, which may indicate that the HQLA could absorb the 
positive effects of a financial stable institution. The share of overnight deposits to total 
deposits on table 6 was significant in most of the regressions computed. Although the share of 
deposits of non-financial corporations to total deposits was not a significant variable in table 
7, the share of household’s deposits to total deposits was a very significant variable on table 8. 
This may indicate that the deposits from households held by a bank is an important variable to 
predict the loans provided to households, while in the case of loans provided to non-financial 
corporations, it is more important the shares of deposits to total assets held by the bank. 
Furthermore, the Macroeconomic variables (EOINA rate, GDP growth rate, unemployment 
rate, house prices growth and the difference between lending margins) were not significant in 
any of the computed regressions. This may indicate that the loans provided by each bank do 
not depend directly on the economic performance of the country in which the bank is 
headquartered. This could be explained by the fact that the regression with the 
macroeconomic variables such as the GDP growth, unemployment rate, and house prices 
growth, do not take into account the different dimensions of banks situated in each country, in 
order to give more weight to countries which have headquartered in them banks that provide a 
greater amount of loans31. Moreover, it shall also be taken into account that there is a free 
market installed in Europe, and there is a great interconnectedness between the countries 
                                                          
31 This may indicate that the use of a cross term between macroeconomic variables and banks’ dimension 
variables may produce a more consistent regression 
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performance, which may indicate that it is not important to separate the different growths per 
country, as banks headquartered in a specific country also provide loans to other countries 
within Europe, and may also have subsidiaries headquartered in a different country, which 
may further increase the level of interconnectedness between loans provided by banks 
headquartered in different countries. 
 
Conclusion 
While there has been a lot of studies provided for both positive and negative effects of capital 
regulation, fewer studies have been provided regarding liquidity regulation. One of the main 
reasons is that minimum liquidity requirements are relatively new, while minimum capital 
requirements have been implemented since Basel I. In this paper, I focused on the impact of  
liquidity regulation on banks’ credit supply. I found that there is evidence that liquidity 
requirements affect negatively banks’ ability to provide loans. Households are more affected 
by liquidity restrictions than non-financial corporations. This results were found in a non-
stressed period for the high-quality liquid assets ratio to total assets. On the other hand, I was 
not able to find a significant impact of the LCR on the loans provided by banks, which is a 
result that supports the use of the LCR as a minimum regulatory requirement. However, the 
high-quality liquid assets represent the most important component of the LCR, as it can also 
be viewed as a measure of liquidity that banks held, and this measure can have an impact on 
the credit supply. The different results on the impacts may be explained by the fact that the 
LCR is a ratio which takes into account additional assumptions on a banks’ liquidity position. 
Moreover, since the ratio is publicly disclosed, the higher the ratio is, the more the bank is 
seen as being financial stable by investors, which can further improve banks’ credit supply. 
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Annex 1 
Equation 1: LCR ratio calculation  
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐵𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑎 30 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (%) 
Table 1: LCR Minimum requirements for32 
 
 
Equation 2: ILG ratio visualization for a specific credit institution 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠
 > x% 
Table 2: Definitions and explanations of variables included in regressions 
Type of variable Variable  name Short definition Reasons for inclusion 
Dependent Variable Households_NFC_to_TA Share of total loans (made in 
period “t” by bank “i” 
headquartered in country “j”) to 
total assets of bank “i” 
The impact on this variable are the 
main point of interest of this paper 
Dependent Variable Households_to_TA 
 
Share of total household’s loans 
(made in period “t” by bank “i” 
headquartered in country “j”) to 
total assets of bank “i” 
It is also on the interest of this paper 
to separate the impact on loans from 
loans to households and loans to 
non-financial corporations 
Dependent Variable NFC_to_TA 
 
Share of total non-financial 
corporation’s loans (made in 
period “t” by bank “i” 
headquartered in country “j”) to 
total assets of bank “i”  
It is also on the interest of this paper 
to separate the impact on loans from 
loans to households and loans to 
non-financial corporations 
Variable of interest HQLA_to_TA High Quality Liquid Assets ratio 
to Total Assets held by bank “i” 
headquartered in country “j” at 
time “t” 
I have opted to look more closely at 
the impact of HQLAs on loans 
provided by banks  
Variable of interest LCR 
 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio held 
by bank “i” headquarter in 
country “j” in period “t” 
The main point of this paper is 
exactly to estimate the impact of the 
LCR on banks’ loans. However, I 
have opted to look more closely at 
the impact of HQLAs 
Regulatory variable CET1ratio  
 
Common Equity Tier 1 ratio 
held by bank “i” headquartered 
in country “j” on period “t”  
CET1 ratio is a very important 
measures on the regulatory 
framework of banks. It´s inclusion is 
essential as it may affects banks’ 
loans 
Regulatory variable ShortFall_100p 
 
Shortfall of a bank ”i” 
headquartered in country “j” at 
time “t” to the 2019 binding 
regulatory LCR (100%). 
Banks which are not complying with 
the 2019 binding LCR may have 
constraints in providing lending 
activities 
Deposit indicator ShareOfDepOnTA 
 
Share of total deposits over total 
assets of bank “i” headquartered 
in country “j” at time “t” 
The more deposits a bank has over 
their total assets, the more lending it 
is expected for it to provide  
Deposit indicator ShareOfHHDepOnTotalDep 
 
Share of household deposits to 
total deposits held by a bank “i” 
headquarter at country “j” at 
time “t” 
Only included in the estimation of 
the impact of LCR/HQLA on loans 
made to households 
                                                          
32 Retrieved from: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/basel3_phase_in_arrangements.pdf 
1 January 2015 1 January 2016 1 January 2017 1 January 2018 1 January 2019 
60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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Deposit indicator ShareOfNFCDepOnTotalDep Share of non-financial 
corporations’ deposits to total 
deposits held by a bank “i” 
headquarter in country “j” at 
time “t” 
Only included in the estimation of 
the impact of LCR on loans made to 
non-financial corporations  
Deposit indicator ShareofOvernightDepOnTotalDep Share of total overnight deposits 
held by bank “i” headquarter in 
country “j” to their total deposits 
at time “t” 
Measure of short-term funding held 
by a bank. If it is significant, it may 
be expected that the bank may have 
liquidity issues on stress periods 
Dimension Variable LN_TA  
 
Logarithm of the total assets of 
bank “i” at time “t” 
This indicator takes into account the 
dimension of the bank. It can also 
add additional information on their 
international business activity 
Interest rate 
variable/Macro 
-economic variable 
EOINARATE 
 
The Euro Overnight Index 
Average for time “t” indicates 
the short-term interbank interest 
rate for the euro-zone. This was 
calculated on a quarterly basis 
by computing a simple average 
of the 1-day EOINA rate. 
The inclusion of this variable is 
essential to have a measure on 
banks’ short-term cost of borrowing 
(which can have an impact on total 
loans provided to the economy).  
Macroeconomic variable GDPgrowthpercountry 
 
Gross Domestic Product growth 
rate for country “j” in period “t” 
The GDP growth rate is an indicator 
of economic activity. It is expected 
that the correlation is positive  
Macroeconomic variable Unemploymentrate 
 
Unemployment rate for country 
“j” in period “t” 
Employment is one of the main 
drivers of economic activity. The 
correlation is expected to be positive  
Macroeconomic variable Housepricesgrowth House prices growth rate in 
period “t” for a country “j” 
 
 
House prices growth can be an 
important indicator to measure 
households’ borrowing needs. This 
in turn may affect banks’ lending  
Loans’ profitability 
indicator/Macroeconomic 
variable 
 
DiffBankLendMarg 
 
Difference in banks’ lending 
margins from households to 
non-financial corporations 
This can measure the opportunity 
cost of banks’ lending to households 
instead of non-financial corporations 
 
Figure 1: XTOVERID results in Stata for a test of Fixed vs Random effects  
 
Figure 2: Hausman test for Fixed Effects vs Random Effects 
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Figure 3: Linear correlation between total loans         Figure 4: Linear Correlation between total 
loans and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio                       and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio        
aggregated per country  
            
Figure 5: Loans’ weight on total assets per bank:     Figure 6: Liquidity Coverage Ratio: average  
average and individual observations across time      and individual observations across time 
           
 
Figure 7: Linear prediction between 
the CET1 ratio and the LCR 
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Table 3: Impact of the LCR on total bank loans
 
 
Table 4: Impact of the LCR on total bank loans to households 
 
 
Table 5: Impact of LCR on total bank loans to non-financial corporations 
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Table 6: Impact of HQLA ratio to total assets on total bank loans  
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Table 7: Impact of HQLA ratio to total assets on total bank loans to non-financial corporations 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Table 8: Impact of HQLA ratio to total assets on total bank loans to Households 
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Annex 2 
The Basel III framework was introduced in 2010 in order to revise areas such as market risk, 
counterparty credit risk and securitization in order to better capture the associated risks 
(Ingves, 2018).  
Although the leverage ratio was implemented by the Basel III framework in order to 
bring a risk-insensitive measure (BIS 2016), there was also still a need for more risk-sensitive 
indicators, as there were some risks that the Basel II framework did not addressed. A greater 
interconnectedness between international financial institutions was proven to exist, which 
consequently created a global systemic risk that had to be taken into account in the new Basel 
framework (BIS, 2010). Therefore, a macroprudential perspective was implemented to the 
regulatory framework (Ingves, 2018). The Basel committee not only developed a 
countercyclical capital buffer to build banks’ prudential capital in periods of excessive 
growth, but also built buffers to address the interconnectedness of the European financial 
system. Global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), domestic systemically important 
banks (D-SIBs) and other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs) could be assigned 
additional buffers for their systemic importance in an international or domestic level. Also, 
capital conservation buffers were implemented in the Basel III framework, which created an 
incentive for banks to limit discretionary distributions in times of stress (BIS 2010). Pillar 2 
(banking supervision) and Pillar 3 (transparency and market discipline) were reinforced in 
Europe with the implementation of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)33, Capital 
                                                          
33 For reference, please see the Official Journal of the European Union: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=EN 
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Requirements Directive (CRD)34, and Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)35. 
The competent authorities, mainly the ECB and the European Banking Authority, were better 
equipped with tools to impose restrictions on European banks in order to mitigate the 
likelihood and the impact of banks’ failure. Moreover, when not possible to prevent the 
failures, what is relevant is to avoid the burden to fall on European taxpayers. In the United 
States, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) implemented the Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity 
(TLAC) standard, for specific global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) which would 
prevent an unorderly failure of the banks in which public funds could need to be used.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 For reference, please see the Official Journal of the European Union: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0036&from=EN 
 
35 For reference, please see the Official Journal of the European Union: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN 
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Annex 3 
Since the benefits of a sound banking system are very hard to measure, not many studies have 
quantified them. One of the main benefits of liquidity regulation is that it “may reduce the 
contraction of bank credit in response to liquidity shocks, thereby resulting in a lower 
reduction in aggregate output associated with banking crises than in its absence” (BIS, 2016). 
In fact, in a study on liquidity risk management and credit supply by US banks in the 2008-
2009 financial crisis, by analyzing how banks adjusted their holding of cash and other liquid 
assets, it was found that “banks with more illiquid asset portfolios, … , increased their 
holdings of liquid assets and decreased lending.  Most of the decline in bank credit production 
during the height of the crisis can be explained by liquidity risk exposure.” (Cornett, McNutt, 
Strahan and Tehranian, 2011). Similar results were also found in a study in which the authors 
used bank-firm level data, in order to study the causal relation between French banks’ 
liquidity risk and their lending capacity in the period of 2007-2008. The study supports the 
rationale of the liquidity regulation. The authors showed that “Lower funding risk and a lower 
maturity mismatch immunise banks from funding shocks. This in turn allows banks to 
continue extending longterm loans to firms in times of funding stress. Such a regulation might 
thus support economic growth during periods of downturn by ensuring that banks continue 
their role of long-term funding providers for firms that cannot access alternative financing 
sources.” (Pessarossi and Vinas, 2015). 
In fact, the argument of a positive impact of liquidity regulations on the lending capacity of  
banks would be counter-intuitive in a non-stress scenario. However, in a stress scenario, 
liquidity regulations may indeed help to provide for liquidity buffers which may attenuate the 
negative impact on the lending provided by credit institutions.  
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It should also be referred that a net benefit analyzes on the costs and benefits of the 
regulation is very difficult to perform. The reason is that it is very hard to quantify the 
benefits of liquidity regulation in terms of the events it avoids, since the regulation prevents 
this empirical events to occur in the first place. Furthermore, the benefits arising from the 
lower costs and likelihood of bank failure are very hard to quantify. In fact, “a comprehensive 
empirical assessment of the net welfare benefits of liquidity regulations has not been 
conducted by any single study” (BIS, 2016). 
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